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LEGAL NATURE OF THE AMERICAN COUNTY
THE LEGAL NATURE AND STATUS OF THE
AMERICAN COUNTY
By CHARLES Al. KNEIER*
A REVIEW of judicial decisions indicates the general doctrine
that the American county has a legal position wholly sub-
ordinate to the state government. But the extreme view seems to
call for qualification in the light of constitutional and statutory
provisions, as well as other developments; and this situation is
recognized to some extent in some of the recent decisions.
The Anglo-Saxon shire was a district of large local autonomy,
subject to only limited control by the central govermnent. But
with the development of a more highly centralized government
in England after the Norman Conquest, the county came to be
considered as primarily an administrative district for the general
government, and was not recognized as having the legal status
of a municipal corporation," when the borough came to receive
this recognition. The same view was applied to the early Ameri-
can county, and was continued after the practice of local election of
county officers had developed, and other changes were introduced
in the state constitutions and laws.
In a case before the Supreme Court of the United States in
1845 Chief Justice Taney stated that:
"Counties are nothing more than certain portions of the ter-
ritory into which the state is divided for the more convenient
exercise of the powers of government."'
It has been held that they "exist only for the purpose of the
general political government of the state."'3 More conservatively,
another court has stated that "a county organization is created
almost exclusively with a view to the policy of the state at large."'
Counties are now referred to as bodies corporate and politic,
and are recognized as public corporations. In some states they
*Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska,
Lincoln, Neb.
'Russell v. Devon County, (1788) 2 Durn. & E. 667.2State of Maryland v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., (1845) 3
How. (U.S.) 534, 11 L. Ed. 714. Also see State v. Board of Commis-
sioners, (Ind. 1907) 82 N. E. 482.3Madden v. Lancaster Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1894) 65 Fed. 188,
191, 12 C. C. A. 566. Cf. Independent Publishing Co. v. Lewis and
Clark County, (1904) 30 Mont. 83, 75 Pac. 860; Yamhill v. Foster,
(1909) 53 Or. 124, 99 Pac. 286.
4State v. Downs, (1899) 60 Kan. 788, 57 Pac. 962.
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are now included in the class of municipal corporations; but in
most states they are considered only as quasi corporations, along
with townships, school districts and road districts. This term
is used to indicate the low rank they hold in the scale of corporate
existence and serves to distinguish them from municipal and from
private corporations.5
The distinction between municipal and quasi corporations, such
as counties, was well expressed by the supreme court of Ohio
in a case before it in 1857.6 The court emphasized the fact that
"municipal corporations proper are called into existence, either
at the direct solicitation or by the free consent of the people who
compose them." In the case of counties, however, the court
pointed out that they are:
"local subdivisions of a state, created by the sovereign power
of the state, of its own sovereign will, without the particular
solicitation, cofisent or concurrent action of the people who in-
habit them. The former organization is asked for, or at least as-
sented to by the people it embraces; the latter is superimposed
by a sovereign and paramount authority. A municipal corpora-
tion proper is created mainly for the interest, advantage, and con-
venience of the locality and its people; a county is created almost
exclusively with a view to the policy of the state at large, for
purposes of political organization and civil administration, in mat-
ters of finance, of education, of provision for the poor, of mili-
tary organization, of the means of travel and transport, and
especiallyfor the general administration of justice. With scarcely
an exception, all the powers and functions of the county organi-
zation have a direct and exclusive reference to the general policy
of the state, and are, in fact, but a branch of the general ad-
ministration of that policy."
7
51 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., sec. 57.
"Comrhissioners of Hamilton County v. Mighels, (1857) 7 Ohio
St. 109. Also see Scales v. Chatahoochee County, (1870) 41 Ga. 225;
Granger v. Pulaski County, (1870) 26 Ark. 37; O'Neal v. Jennette,(1925) 190 N. C. 96, 129 S. E. 184.7The supreme court of Illinois in a case before it in 1924, in
comparing the legal nature of municipal and quasi corporations said:
"Municipal corporations are those called into existence either at
the direct request or by consent of the persons composing them.Quasi municipal corporations, such as counties and townships, are at
most but local organizations, which are created by general law, with-
out the consent of the inhabitants thereof, for the purpose of tile civil
and political administration of government, and they are invested with
but few characteristics of corporate existence. They are, in other
words, local subdivisions of the state created by the sovereign power
of the state of its own will, without regard to the wishes of the people
inhabiting them. A municipal corporation is created principally for
the advantage and convenience of the people of the locality. County
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While in most states judicial opinions distinguish counties
from municipal corporations, there are a number of states where
counties are recognized as municipal corporations by constitutional
or statutory provisions, or in judicial opinions. In North Caro-
lina, Alabama and Montana, counties are dealt with in the state
constitution under the general title of municipal corporations. In
North and South Carolina, Indiana, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyo-
ming, counties have been classed as municipal corporations by
the courts.8 In New York state, by act of 1892, counties are
declared to be municipal corporations; and it has been held by
the supreme court of the state that, in view of this act, it seems
hardly open to question that a county is a municipal corporation,
suable and capable of suing in its own name like any and all
corporations. 9
POWER OF THE STATE LEGISLATURE OVER COUNTIES
Resulting from the nature of counties as administrative dis-
tricts and agents of the state, created for governmental purposes
and for greater convenience in carrying on public affairs, is the
and township organizations are created in this state with a view
to carrying out the policy of the state at large for the administration
of matters of political government, finance, education, taxing, care
of the poor, military organization, means of travel and the admin-
istration of justice. The powers and functions of county and town-
ship organizations therefore, as distinguished from municipal corpo-
rations, have a direct and exclusive bearing on and reference to the
general, rather than local, policy of the state." Cook County v. City
of Chicago, (1924) 311 IIl. 234, 142, N. E. 512, 31 A. L. R. 442.
The supreme court of Louisiana has pointed out that in that
state, "Parishes, like counties in other states, are involuntary political
or civil divisions of the state, designed to aid in the administration of
government, as state auxiliaries or functionaries, possessing no other
powers than those delegated, ranking low down in the scale of cor-
porate existence, and well distinguishable from municipal corporations
proper, which are vested with more extensive powers and endowed with
more important functions and a larger measure of corporate life."
Parish of West Carroll v. Gaddis, (1882) 34 La. Ann. 928. 931.
Also see County of San Mateo v. Coburn, (1900) 130 Cal. 631.
636, 63 Pac. 78; Garr v. Fuls, (1926) 286 Pa. 137, 133 At. 150.
sGooch v. Gregory, (1871) 65 N. C. 142; Glenn v. York Co., (1873)
6 S. C. 412; Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of
Albany County, (1876) 92 U. S. 307, 23 L. Ed. 552; Board of Com-
missioners of Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, (1876) 93 U. S. 108, 23 L.
Ed. 822; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, (1880) 100 U. S. 514. 25 L. Ed.
699; Territory v. Hopkins, (1899) 9 Oki. 133, 59 Pac. 976; Brite v.
Atascosa County, (Tex, Civ. App. 1923) 247 S. W. 878.
92 N. Y. Birdseye, Cumming and Gilbert, Consol. Laws. 2d ed..
p. 1378; Kennedy v. Queens County, (1900) 47 App. Div. 250, 62
N. Y. S. 276. Cf. Wadsworth v. Board of Supervisors, (1916) 217
N. Y. 484, 112 N. E. 161.
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complete and plenary power of the legislature over counties,
except where specific provisions of the constitution govern.1  It
follows as a necessary corollary of the fact that counties are
merely political entities or subdivisions of the state that "the
state may, through its legislature, and in the exercise of its sov-
ereign power and will, in all cases where the people themselves
have not restricted or qualified such exercise of power, appor-
tion and delegate to the county any functions which belong to
it." It also follows, however, that, "on the other hand, the state
may take back and itself resume the exercise of certain functions
which it has delegated to those local agencies."11
The Supreme Court of the United States, in considering the
question of legislative control over counties and "the paramount
authority of the state, in respect as well of its acts as of its prop-
erty and revenue held for public purposes," has said: "The
state made it, and could, in its discretion, unmake it, and admin-
ister such property and revenue through other instrumentalities."12
The supreme court of North Carolina has held that since counties
are but agencies of the state government, "They can be created,
changed or abolished at the legislative will."
'1 3
The power of the legislature over counties because of their
nature as quasi corporations may be shown by its control over
county property.
The supreme court of Missouri has upheld the constitution-
ality of an act of the state legislature directing the county to ap-
propriate part of its revenue, already collected, in a certain way.
The court pointed out that the country is not a private corporation
"but an agency of the state government, and though as a public
corporation it holds property, such holding is subject to a large
extent to the will of the legislature. Whilst the legislature cannot
take away from a county its property, it has full power to direct
'
0 State v. Board of Supervisors, (1925) 141 Miss. 701, 105 So.
541; Divide County v. Baird, (1926) 55 N. D. 45. 212 N. W. 236: Mc-
Henry County v. Northern Trust Co., (1924) 51 N. D. 646, 200 N.
W. 888; Edwards v. Lewis and Clark County, (1917) 53 Mont, 359.
165 Pac. 297; McSurely v. McGrew, (1908) 140 Iowa 163. 118 N. W.
415, 132 Am. St. Rep. 248; Hammond v. Clark, (1911) 136 Ga. 313,
71 S. E. 479, 38 L. R. A. (N.S.) 77.
"County of Sacramento v. Chambers, (1917) 33 Cal. App. 142, 164
Pac. 613. Also see Watson v. Greely, (1924) 67 Cal. App. 328, 227
Pac. 664.
"-Rogers Locomotive Machine Works v. American Emigrant Co.,
(1896) 164 U. S. 559, 17 Sup. Ct. 188, 41 L. Ed. 552.
"3State v. Commissioners of Haywood County, (1898) 122 N. C.
812, 30 S. E. 352.
LEGAL NATURE OF THE AMERICAN COUNTY 145
the mode in which the property shall be used for the benefit of
the county."' 4
The control of the legislature over county property is shown
in a forceful manner in a case before the United States circuit
court for the district of North Dakota in a case before it in 1898)
In this case a county had been sued on a warrant, but the plaintiff
was defeated on the ground that the county commissioners had
no authority to contract for the services for which the warrant
was given. The state legislature afterwards passed an act author-
izing contracts of a like nature and validating those theretofore
made. In upholding the validity of this act, the United States
circuit court considered the nature of a county as a quasi corpora-
tion and mere instrumentality of the state, "at all times, both as
to its power and its rights, subject to legislative control." In con-
sidering the extent of legislative control over the property of a
county, the court said:
"While it is no doubt true that the legislature has not such
transcendent and absolute power over these bodies that it can
apply property held by them to private purposes or to public
purposes wholly disconnected with the community embraced within
their limits, still it is true that a purely public corporation like a
county, cannot acquire any vested interest which will preclude the
legislature from directing the application of all its property and
rights to the performance of those governmental functions which
pertain to the community embraced within the corporation and for
the performance of which the corporation was created. If it were
otherwise, counties, instead of being agencies of the state for
administering the government, would be petty sovereignties, to
impede and defeat the state with claims of local interest and
authority."
Another case which illustrates the legal status of the property
held by counties was before the supreme court of Illinois in 1911.'
A city attempted to take, by eminent domain, a strip of land
through the county poor farm for street purposes. While cities
had been authorized to take property for public, purposes by the
right of eminent domain, the supreme court of Illinois held that
they could not take the property used for a poor farm since this
was not private property. The county was held to have "no powers
14State v. County Court of St. Louis County, (1864) 34 Mo. 546.
Also see Board of Commissioners v. Lucas, (1876) 93 U. S. 108. 23
L Ed. 822.35Erskine v. Steele, (C.C.N.D. 1898) 87 Fed. 630.
loCity of Edwardsville v. Madison County, (1911) 251 II. 265,
96 N. E. 238, 37 L. R. A. (N.S.) 101.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
except such as are derived from the statutes constitutionally
enacted, and it can own no private property." The court went on
to say that:
"Property, the title to which is vested in the county, is public
property, held by the county as a state agency, and in the absence
of positive constitutional restriction is subject to the disposition of
the Legislature without the consent of the county authorities."
This same principle was brought out in a case before the
supreme court of Illinois in 1924.17 Cook county brought suit
against the city of Chicago to restrain it from enforcing its fire
and building ordinances in the construction of a jail within the
city limits on the grounds that the county was but an "arm of the
state to which there has been committed the control of county
buildings, and that it is not, therefore, subject to the police power
of the city." The supreme court of Illinois, held, however, that
the legislature of the state in delegating the police power to cities
and giving them power to cause all buildings and inclosures in a
dangerous state to be put in a safe condition, intended to confer
upon the city council such power over all buildings within the
city, including county buildings. It was pointed out that "While
the county is an agency of the state, it is likewise a creature of
the state."
In 1921 the legislature of the state of Nebraska passed an act
which provided that the county commissioners of any county
should furnish rooms in the court house for the municipal courts
of any city which wasthe county seat of that particular county.
The county commissioners of the county of which Omaha was
the county seat refused to furnish rooms for the municipal courts
of that city. The supreme court of Nebraska upheld the lower
court in allowing a writ of mandamus to issue against the comniis-
sioners to command them to furnish such rooms for the municipal
courts. The court, in considering the power of the legislature
over county property, said:
"It must be remembered that a county does not possess the
double governmental and private character that cities (to. It is
governmental only, and in that capacity acts purely as an agent of
the state. The funds raised by taxation in the county are subject
to the direction and control of the legislature for public use in that
county. and the property of the county, acquired by funds raised
through taxation, is property of which tile state can direct the
17Cook County v. City of Chicago, (1924) 311 II1. 234, 142 N.
E. 512, 31 A. L. R. 442.
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management and disposition, so long at least as it acts for the
benefit of the public in the taxing district." 'lb
These cases illustrate the power of the legislature over coun-
ties as administrative districts of the state. This complete and
plenary authority extends not only to their powers but also to
their property.
LEGAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
The principle is well established that a state cannot be sued
in its own courts without its consent and permission.'1 Counties
are nothing more than certain portions of territory into which
the state is divided for the more convenient exercise of the powers
of government and a suit against the county is in effect a suit
against the state. Since counties are created for the administra-
tion of justice, the restraint of minor criminals, the relief of pau-
pers, etc., the fact that the state administers these things through
geographical subdivisions does not make the acts any the less acts
of sovereignty.21
It is thus generally held that actions may be maintained either
by or against counties only by virtue of statutory or constitu-
tional authority.22 The supreme court of Oregon in considering
the question of suits against counties has stated that it is the settled
rule that "neither the state itself, nor one of its counties, which
'sState v. Board of Commissioners, (1922) 109 Neb. 35, 189 N.
W. 639.19Briscoe v. Bank, (1837) 11 Pet. (U.S.) 257, 32. 9 L. Ed. 709;
Beers v. Arkansas, (1857) 20 How. (U.S.) 527, 15 L. Ed. 991; Ex. partc
Ayers, (1887) 123 U. S. 443, 505, 8 Sup. Ct. 164. 31 L. Ed. 216; Hans
v. Louisiana, (1889) 134 U. S. 1, 17, 10 Sup. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842;
Smith v. Reeves, (1899) 178 U. S. 430, 440, 20 Sup. Ct. 919, 44 L.
Ed. 1140.2OWooster v. Plymouth, (1882) 62 N. H. 193, -20S; Also see
Maryland v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., (1845) 3 How. (U.S.) 534.
550, 11 L. Ed. 714.2 O'Brien v. Rockingham County, (1923) 80 N. H. 522, 120 Atl.
254; Board of Commissioners of Greer County v. Watson, (1898) 7
Okl. 174, 54 Pac. 441.22Muskogee County v. Lanning and McRoberts, (1915) 51 Okl.
343, 151 Pac. 1054; Board of Commissioners of .Phillips County v.
Churning, (1894) 4 Colo. App. 321, 35 Pac. 918; Whittaker v. Tuolumne
County, (1892) 96 Cal. 100, 30 Pac. 1016; Ellis v. Floyd County, (1920)
24 Ga. App. 717, 102 S. E. 181; Kent v. Wheeler County, (1917) 21
Ga. App. 225, 94 S. E. 271; City of Grenada v. Grenada County. (1917)
115 Miss. 831, 76 So. 682; Jones v. Jefferson County. (1920) 206 Ala.
13, 89 So. 174; Mills v. Chatham County, (1921) 27 Ga. App. 223.
107 S. E. 628; Newman v. St. Louis County, (1920) 145 .Minn. 129.
176 N. W. 191; Buckalew v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Middle-
sex County, (1918) 91 N. J. L. 517, 104 Ati. 308, 2 A. L. R. 718.
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are but instrumentalities of the state in the exercise of its sover-
eignty, can be sued, unless upon express permission given by the
legislative power in the form of a statute permitting the same.
Public policy forbids that the state shall be made a defendant
in litigation without its consent, and as counties are regarded as
parts of the government the exemption is in good reason also
extended to them, unless a statute exists expressly allowing the
maintenance of actions against them."23
The court of appeals of Kentucky has stated that with respect
to the right of a party to sue, "there is a wide difference between
'municipal corporations' and 'counties.' " The principle of non-
liability of the county to suit was stated as follows:
"It is a well-established doctrine in this state, and in harmony
with the rule generally prevailing, that counties are not liable to
suit, unless authority for it can be found in the statute, or it
follows by necessary implication from some express power given.
The reason upon which this rule rests is that counties are subor-
dinate political subdivisions of the state. They are created for
public purposes, and are a part of the necessary machinery of
government, and can no more be sued by a citizen than can the
state."
The court went on to point out, however, that:
"The right of these political subdivisions of the state to sue
is much larger than their right to be sued, and this follows from
the fact that, having control of the bridges, highways, and public
buildings of the county, it is necessary that they should be invested
with all needful power to protect and preserve them, and so it has
been held that a county may maintain an action for injury to its
courthouse or public roads." 4
NoN-LIABILITY OF THE COUNTY FOR TORTS
It may thus be stated as the general holding of the courts that
"as counties are merely geographical divisions of the state for the
convenient exercise of sovereign power each for that purpose
represents the state, and is not suable for default in the exercise
thereof in the absence of statute permitting such suit." ' The courts
also hold that cities are not liable in tort where the officers are
23Rapp v. Multnomah County, (1915) 77 Or. 607, 152 Pac. 243.24Marion County v. Rives and McChord, (1909) 133 Ky. 477, 118
S. W. 309; Commonwealth v. Boske, (1907) 124 Ky. 468, 99 S. W. 316,
30 Ky. L. Rep. 400, 11 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1104.
25State v. Board of Commissioners of Marion County, (1908) 170
Ind. 595, 85 N. E. 513; Brown v. Davis County, (1923) 196 Iowa 1341,
195 N. WV. 363. For exception to this rule see Anne Arundel County
v. Watts, (1910) 112 Md. 353, 76 Atl. 82.
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engaged in governmental functions; from this they reason that
since the county performs, as an agent of the state, only govern-
mental functions, there can be no liability on its part. It is also
stated that no right of action should lie against counties and other
quasi corporations since "these organizations are not voluntary but
compulsory; not for the benefit of individuals who have asked
for such a corporation, but for the public generally."2-
Municipal corporations, on the other hand, are held to a greater
degree of responsibility for torts than are counties and quasi cor-
porations. This is because of their dual character and the nature
and purpose of their creation. Municipal corporations usually
receive a special charter from the state, only at the request of those
to be incorporated. Since municipal corporations are voluntary,
it is assumed that incorporation confers what to them is a valuable
privilege. Some of the special privileges conferred are larger
powers of self government, greater privileges in the acquisition
and control of corporate property, and special authority to make
use of the public highways for the special and peculiar convenience
of the people of the particular city.2
The municipal corporation, in receiving a grant of powers fur
its own beneficial purposes and not for the benefit of the state
as a whole, assumes a greater degree of liability. It is not only
an administrative agent of the state but it is also a unit of local
government; thus it assumes a dual character. In determining the
liability of the municipal corporation for the acts of its officer-,
the courts have pointed out that it receives this grant of power
from the state primarily for the benefit of the people within the
corporation and must assume responsibility for failure to perform
the corporate duties. But as in the case of the quasi corporation.
there is no liability in cases where the municipal corporation per-
forms governmental functions as an agent of the state.While the holding of the courts has been quite general that
counties are not liable in tort since they perform governmental
functions only, there seems to be a tendency to depart from this
rule in some cases. This has been noted especially in cases where
damages have been allowed against counties and other quasi cor-
porations because of the negligent invasion of property rights of
26Cook County v. City of Chicago, (1924) 311 I1. 234, 142 N. E.
512, 31 A. L. R. 442.27See, 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 517; 1
Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., sec. 38.
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persons by the county's use of land which it holds only for public
governmental purposes, as the soil of highways. 8 The allow-
ance of damages in such cases is placed upon the liability of a
landowner for the maintenance of a nuisance on his land to the
injury of his neighbors.2" It has been suggested that such suits
might be maintained because they were brought to redress an
injury to private rights, and that they therefore might be distin-
guished from the cases where an individual depended upon a
public right, such as his right as a traveler on the highways.
The supreme court of New Hampshire, in a case before it in
1923, questioned the decisions which were based upon this reason-
ing, and held that if the counties and quasi corporations were liable
in such cases it established the liability of the state itself." "But,"
according to the opinion of the court, "the state can no more be
sued for injuries caused by its own negligence or that of its serv-
ants or agents or for the results of a nuisance maintained on its
land than it can be for a breach of its promise to pay for service
rendered or money loaned." The court indicated that it could not
agree with the reasoning in these cases by which the liability
of quasi corporations was established; rather it seemed to look
upon the two lines of cases, one holding quasi corporations liable
for negligent invasion of an adjoining owner's property rights
by the use of land which they hold for governmental purposes.
as the soil of highways, and those holding them not liable for
negligent invasion of private personal rights while acting in a
public governmental capacity, as not being logically reconcilable.
Another explanation that has been offered of the two types of
decisions is that:
"the evident justice of the individual cause has influenced the
courts, and led them to seize upon any possible distinction to
afford a remedy for what is clearly a wrong in fact if not in law."" t
Again, it may reflect the tendency to bring into the field of liability
of quasi corporations the question of the soundness of the old
rule of non liability, as was done by Justice Wanamaker of the
2 Newman v. County of St. Louis, (1920) 145 Mlinn. 129, 176
N. XV. 191: Lindstrom v. County of Ramsey. (1917) 136 Minn. 46.
161 N. W. 222; Wheeler v. Gilsum, (1905) 73 N. H. 429. 62 Atd. 597, 3
L. R. A. (N.S.) 135; Clair v. Manchester, (1903) 72 N. H1. 231, 55 Atl.935. 952Burnham v. Windham. (1914) 77 N. H. 103, 88 Atl. 701.
300'Brien v. Rockingham County, (1923) 80 N. H. 522, 120 Atd. 254.
"'See note, (1923) 8 MINh,,.5sorA l.Aw Rvviiiw 164.
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supreme court of Ohio in 1919 in a case dealing with the question
of liability of municipal corporations while performing govern-
mental functions.
3 2
As the state may by statute permit itself to be sued in certain
cases in its own courts, it may also place liability upon counties in
certain classes of cases. 3 This principle is brought out in a case
before the supreme court of Texas in 1926.3 4 Suit was brought
against a county for damages to land and also to the health of
the owner of the land resulting from the flooded property. The
court pointed out that "at common law counties as a rule are not
liable for injuries resulting from the negligence of their officers
or agents, and that no recovery can be had in damages unless
liability be created by statute." The legislature of the state of
Texas had provided for the payment of damages by the county
to land in such cases; therefore, suit for damages to land would
be sustained against the county in the present case. But as neither
the constitution nor the statutes authorized a recovery against
the county for damages to the health of persons on account of
the construction or maintenance of a road, suit in such cases
would not be entertained.
'While municipal corporations are not liable for tort when
engaged in governmental functions, they are liable when they
engage in private or corporate functions. The supreme court of
Georgia had before it in 1926 the question as to whether a count%,
would be liable for damages to one injured while working in a
county rock quarry.35 The court held that a county, in quarrying
and crushing stone on its land for highways. exercises a govern-
mental function, and that no liability attaches to the non per-
formance or improper performance of the duties of the officerq.
agents, or servants of the county in respect to these governmental
32Fowler v. City of Cleveland. (1919) 100 Ohio St. 158. 126 N
E. 72: 9 A. L. R. 131; see concurring opinion of Justice WVanamaker.
On the general question of governmental responsibility in Tort. see
the articles by Professor Borchard in 34 Yale L. T. (1924-25) 1. 120.
229; (1926-27) 36 Yale L. J. 1, 757, 1039; (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev.
577, 734.33For cases in which this has been done see: Decatur County
v. Praytor. Iowton, and Wood Contracting Co., (1927) 163 Ga. 920.
137 S. E. 247; Blum v. Richland County. (1893) 38 S. C. 291, 17 S.
E. 20; Eastman v. Clackamas County. (C.C.Or. 1887) 32 Fed. 24;
Hoexter v. Judson, (1899) 21 Wash. 646. 59 Pac. 498.
34Harris County v. Gerhart. (1926) 115 Tex. 449, 283 S. W. 139.
35Wood v. Floyd County, (1926) 161 Ga. 743, 131 S. E. 882.
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functions. According to the opinion in the case, it would not
affect the public character of the officers, agents or servants of the
county that a purely incidental profit might result to the county
from its operation and management of the quarry, or because of
the sale to the public of a portion of the stone crushed at the
quarry.
The question was also considered as to whether a count),
would be liable in such case if it engaged in the sale of crushed
rock to the public. The court answered this question by saying
that counties were not authorized to engage in the business of
crushing rock for sale to the public, and the acts of its officers
and agents in undertaking to do so would be ultra vires, and that
no liability would attach to the county by reason of the non per-
formance or improper performance of such acts under those
circumstances.
The supreme court of Iowa had a similar question before it
in 1925.36 The county board of supervisors had leased the seventh
floor of the court house to a post of the American Legion for one
year, at an agreed rental of one hundred dollars per month. The
contract provided that the county was to furnish elevator service.
The plaintiff in this case was injured in the elevator while going
to the rooms occupied by the American Legion, on private busi-
ness concerned with the affairs of the Legion. The court, in
holding the county not liable in this case for damages, pointed out
that it was a well established rule in that state that "counties are
not liable for torts growing out of the negligent acts of their
agents or employees." The plaintiff argued, however, that there
was liability in this case, since the county was not carrying out
any "governmental powers," but that in renting a portion of the
courthouse to the American Legion it was engaged in a "private
enterprise," and that it was liable for the acts of its employees in
connection with rooms so rented.
The court conceded, "for the sake of argument," that if the
board of supervisors had the authority to so lease a portion of the
courthouse to private parties and collect rent therefor, it would
follow that the county might be liable for the negligent acts of its
servants and employees in connection with the use of the rented
premises. The court held, however, that the county board had no
36Hilgers v. Woodbury County, (1925) 200 Iowa 1318. 206 N.
W. 660.
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such power under the Iowa law, and "that the county cannot be
held liable for the negligent acts of its employee directly connected
with the business of carrying out the said unauthorized contract."
These cases indicate that the county is not liable in tort for
injuries resulting from some proprietary function in which it is
engaged, in case it is not authorized by law to engage in such
activity. In such cases the acts of its officers and agents in carrying
out the unauthorized proprietary function are ultra vires and no
liability attaches to the county, either for their non performance
or improper performance. A different question is presented, how-
ever, in case the proprietary function in which the county is
engaged is authorized by law.
The question of liability on the part of a county when engaged
in a proprietary function was considered by the supreme court of
Wisconsin in a case before it in 1927.17 Sparks, which had escaped
from a steam shovel operated by the county to remove gravel
and road material which was being sold to the county, burned
adjoining property. The county had been warned by the adjoin-
ing property owners of the defective nature of the engine. The
court, in holding the county liable, notwithstanding its govern-
mental character, held that the relation of the county to an adjoin-
ing property owner in such case was that of one proprietor to
another. It could see "no reason in justice or morals why a group
should not be liable to one to whom its agents have done injury
when a member of the group would be liable if he had done the
same injury to another member of the group." The growing ten-
dency towards greater liability on the part of municipal corpora-
tions was pointed out. Counties had by statute been made liable
for mob violence in Wisconsin, which as pointed out by the court,
was liability for the failure to perform a purely governmental
function, the furnishing of adequate protection to life and prop-
erty. Taking these factors into consideration, the county was held
liable in the present case since the damages resulted not from mere
performance of governmental functions but from an act of a
county in its proprietary capacity3s
In several states counties have been held liable for their torts
when they were acting, not as governmental agents, but as private
corporations, or where they were performing some special duty
37Young v. Juneau County, (Wis. 1927) 212 N. W. 295.
38Cf. Matson v. Dane County, (1920) 172 Wis. 522, 179 N. XV. 774.
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voluntarily accepted or assumed." Insofar as such functions are
concerned, the county is no longer a quasi corporation, but in
assuming the privileges must also assume the liabilities as in the
case of a municipal corporation. It, should be noted, however,
that such cases are few, and that in most matters the county still
occupies its position as an agent of the state, performing only
governmental functions, for which there is no liability in tort. The
county has not extended its functions into the proprietary field as
has the municipal corporation; it still maintains to a large degree
its position as an administrative agent of the state, performing
political and governmental functions.
It has been pointed out above that the state may by statute
make the county liable to suit in the courts. Several states have
provided for suits against counties for injuries to person and
damage to property resulting from mobs and riots. The laws of
New York provide that a city or county shall be liable to a person
whose property is destroyed or injured by a mob or riot, if the
consent or negligence of such person did not contribute to such
destruction or injury.40 All counties in Illinois, Ohio, Wiscon-
sin, New Jersey, and West Virginia, and Philadelphia and Alle-
gheny counties in Pennsylvania have also been made subject to
suits for damages resulting from mobs or riots.4 1 South Carolina
provides that:
"In all cases of lynching when death ensues the county where
such lynching takes place shall, without regard to the conduct of
the officers, be liable in exemplary damages of not less than two
thousand dollars, to be recovered by action in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction by the legal representatives of the person
lynched."4 2
39Coburn v. San Mateo County, (C.C. Cal. 1896) 75 Fed. 520:
Barbour County v. Horn, (1872) 48 Ala. 649; Hannon v. St. Louis
County, (1876) 62 Mo. 313; Comanche County v. Burks, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1914) 166 S. IV. 470; Theilen v. Tillamook County. (1915) 75
Or. 214; 146 Pac. 828; Barfield v. Macon County, (1899) 109 Ga.
386, 34 S. E. 596; Berger v. Kanawha County, (1922) 92 W. Va.
424, 114 S. E. 750; Warnock v. Mobile County, (1918) 17 Ala. App.
206, 84 So. 396.
40N. Y. Cahill's Consol. Laws, 1923, ch. 26, sec. 71. Cf. Ely v.
Niagara County, (1867) 36 N. Y. 297.41Ohio, 1 Page's Gen. Code, ch. 20; 4 N. J. Comp. Stat. p. 4381;
Pa. Stat. 1920, secs. 15687-89; W. Va., Barnes Code, 1923, p. 2689;
Illinois Laws. Act of June 15, 1887, Act of May 10, 1905; Allegheny
County v. Gibson, (1879) 90 Pa. 397; Champaign County v. Church,
(1900) 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N. E. 50, 48 L. R. A. 738; 78 Am. St.
Rep. 718.
423 S. C. Code of Laws, 1922, sec. 5601; Cantey v. Clarendon
County, (1915) 101 S. C. 141, 85 S. E. 228.
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In several other states counties have been made subject to suit
in certain classes of cases, by statutory provision. In Maryland
and Washington a more general liability has been established.43
LIABILITY OF COUNTY ON CONTRACTS
The immunity of the state from suits for breach of contract
has not been applied generally to counties. In most jurisdictions
there is a greater liability to suit on contracts on the part of the
county than the state. Thus it is generally held that the county
may be sued for breach of contract, even in the absence of express
statutory provision to this effect.4 4 The Kentucky court of appeals
has held that "where a county has authority to make a contract, it
would follow as an incident that it might sue or be sued concerning
it." In a later case the court in referring to this statement said:
"That language refers only to an express contract. It was not
intended to convey the idea, nor would it be proper to do so, that
the right to sue could be implied from an implied contract."
More recently the same court has stated that:
"a county cannot be sued, unless there is a statute which ex-
pressly authorizes such an action to be maintained, or the right to
do so can be necessarily implied from an express power given, or it
may be sued upon an express contract, which the county has
authority to make."'"
In a few states there has been an extension to the county of
immunity enjoyed by the states from suits on contracts. The
appellate court of Indiana in considering this question has said:
"Boards of county commissioners, in improving highways and
entering into contracts for that purpose, are not acting as agents
43Ann Arundel County v. Watts, (1910) 112 Md. 353, 76 Ati. 82;
Austin v. King County, (1918) 103 Wash. 176, 173 Pac. 1020; State
v. Superior County, (1918) 104 Wash. 268, 176 Pac. 352.
"4Coles County v. Goehring, (1904) 209 Ill. 142, 70 N. E. 610;
Stange v. Esval, (1923) 67 Mont. 301, 215 Pac. 807; Decatur County
v. Roberts, (1925) 159 Ga. 528, 126 S. E. 460; Oak Grove Construc-
tion Co. v. Jefferson County, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1915) 219 Fed. 858;
American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Westchester County, (C.C.A.
2d Cir. 1915) 225 Fed. 947; Kennedy v. Queens County, (1900) 47
App. Div. 250, 62 N. Y. S. 276; Board of Commissioners of Clark
County v. Bentley and Sons, (1921) 103 Ohio St. 443, 134 N. E. 441;
J. M. Dougan Co. v. Klamath County, (1920) 99 Or. 436, 193 Pac.
645; Hillside Securities Co. .. Minter, (1923) 300 Mo. 380, 254 S. NV.
188; Krieger v. Standard Printing Co., (1921) 191 Ky. 552, 231 S.
XV. 27; Howard County v. Pesha, (1919) 103 Neb. 296, 172 N. W. 55.
45 Commonwealth v. Boske, (1907) 124 Ky. 468 99 S. W. 316,
30 Ky. L. Rep. 400, 11 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1104; First National Bank v.
Christian County, (Ky. 1908) 106 S. W. 831; Breathitt County v.
Hagins, (1919) 183 Ky. 294, 207 S. W. 713.
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of a municipal corporation. In such cases they are by virtue of
the statute acting as agents of the state, and, in the absence of a
statute, no action can be maintained against such board for damages
because of a breach of contract."
The court went on to say that cases involving the right to prose-
cute an action against an individual or against a municipal cor-
poration for breach of contract were not in point.4" The superior
court of Delaware, after pointing out that the counties in that state
had been held not liable in tort, said:
"There has been no express decision in this state that a cause
of action arising ex contractu, would not lie against the county.
But after reflection we are not able to see our way to the con-
clusion that there is any essential difference or any sufficient
reason to except a case ex contractu from the general common-law
rule that actions will not lie against the county, or the levy court
commissioners, who represent the county."'"
CONCLUSION
While the underlying doctrine, supported by the preponderance
of judicial opinion, is to the effect that the county is merely an
administrative district of the state and has a legal status distinctly
different from that of a municipal corporation, full consideration
of the present status of the American county seems to call for
some qualification of this view. Constitutional provisions in man'y
states have imposed important limitations on the power of the legis-
lature over counties. By statutes they are quite regularly subject
to suit in cases of contract, and to some extent in cases of tort;
and county boards and officers are not exempt from compulsory
judicial processes to secure obedience to the law. Moreover his-
torical study of the county indicates that even in early days it
acted to some extent as an organ of local government as well as
an agent of the state. With the development of public services
in recent years such local activities have increased, as in the main-
tenance of hospitals, libraries, parks, and aviation landing fields.
These developments indicate that the county, in fact as well as
in law, is approaching more nearly the position of a municipal
corporation.
4rBuck v. Indiana Construction Co., (1923) 79 Ind. App. 329, 138
N. E. 356. The court held that the proper remedy in this case was
in injunction to restrain the cancellation of the contract.4 7Duncan v. Willits, (1903) 4 Pennewill (Del.) 493, 57 Ad. 369.
